Expanding ACCE: Robust Secure Channel Establishment by Hale, Britta
Expanding ACCE:
Robust Secure Channel Establishment
Britta Hale
NTNU, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
britta.hale@ntnu.no
Abstract
Analysis of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
has motivated the development of the Authenticated and
Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) model, due
to the impossibility of modeling key indistinguishability
in TLS. As proposed, the intended channel established
by ACCE demands perfect message delivery. While these
goals are realistic for TLS, they are not for DTLS, for
which key indistinguishability is also impossible. In this
work we discuss modeling issues for a variety of channel
constraints and extend the ACCE model for channels with
more robust channel goals, such as DTLS.
Keywords: Authenticated and secure channel establishment
(ACCE), secure channels, AEAD, TLS, DTLS, QUIC
1 Introduction
Key exchange protocol analysis is historically premised on the
indistinguishability of the derived key from a random value. However,
some protocols, such as the Transport Layer Security1 (TLS) protocol
[DR08], cannot achieve this goal because of its key confirmation
messages. Although such a failure would typically allow for the
protocol to be dismissed as insecure, there is no known attack on TLS
that exploits this “weakness”. Indeed, TLS (in various versions) has
This paper was presented at the NIK-2017 conference; see
http://www.nik.no/.
1When referring to TLS, we refer to TLS 1.2 [DR08] throughout, although
previous versions also suffer from a lack of key indistinguishability. TLS 1.3
(in draft [Res17]) aims to correct this issue; however, it is unlikely that all prior
protocol versions will be phased out of existence in the near or even distant future.
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Figure 1: Datagram TLS (DTLS) handshake.
been in existence since 1999 and has emerged as the foremost protocol
in internet security. This conundrum led to the development of
the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE)
model for better analysis of TLS by Jager et al. [JKSS12], which
uses a monolithic security analysis of a composed key exchange and
channel. ACCE does not demand key indistinguishability, instead
requiring that the derived key, when used, results in a secure channel.
Protocols which have been analyzed in the ACCE model include TLS
and SSH [JKSS12, KPW13, BDK+14], and variants of the model have
been applied in analyses of pre-shared key ciphersuites of TLS, QUIC,
and EMV [LSY+14, LJBN15, BSWW13].
Saliently, ACCE requires perfect packet delivery in a secure
channel, with replay detection, no packet dropping, and a strict
delivery of packets in increasing order. These assumptions are not
always realistic or desired. ACCE was motivated by TLS, for which
such demands are appropriate; however, other real-world protocols
exist which allow for packet dropping and re-ordering, and even
packet replays. Previous research by Boyd et al.[BHMS16] provides a
hierarchy of authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
guarantees – namely, basic authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD); AEAD plus replay detection, and AEAD ensuring
strictly increasing order of receipt and replay detection , and “perfect
delivery”. [BHMS16] also provides examples of corresponding real-
world protocols, including Datagram TLS (DTLS) [RM12], DTLS
with replay detection, and 802.11 [IEE12].
Like TLS, DTLS does not achieve key indistinguishability, as the
session key is used to encrypt the handshake Finished messages
(see Figure 1) and an adversary can therefore distinguish between
a random and real key (from the key exchange experiment) by trial
decryption. Thus analyses of DTLS variants (with/without replay
protection) require ACCE-like models. In order to address this issue,
we present ACCE-q: a hierarchy of ACCE-like oracles corresponding
to various channel security goals. Building the hierarchy, we start at
basic AEAD goals (ACCE-1) and sequentially add replay protection
(ACCE-2), strict increasing order demands (ACCE-3), and packet
dropping restrictions (ACCE-4). In this sequence, the strictest
(ACCE-4) corresponds to the original ACCE oracles. ACCE-1 and
ACCE-2 would be appropriate for analysis of DTLS and DTLS with
optional replay protection, respectively. Channel goals in ACCE-3
align with those of 802.11, making ACCE-3 ideal for application to
any similar protocol which cannot achieve key indistinguishability.
Contributions We provide variations of the ACCE channel
experiment oracles under the goals of basic AEAD, AEAD plus replay
detection, and AEAD ensuring strict increasing order of receipt and
replay detection. We compare our oracles to those of the original
ACCE model, enabling the analysis of secure channel establishment.
Our models are the essential first step in the formal analysis of
DTLS and other real-world protocols which are required to be more
robust to errors than TLS. We specifically address encryption and
decryption oracle queries under varying environments; these oracles
can be combined with various partnering definitions, or other pre-
accept phase ACCE model variants.
Outline Section 2 describes modeling and analysis issues for real-
world protocols, Section 3 introduces AEAD and the ACCE model,
Section 4 introduces the ACCE-q hierarchy, and application of
ACCE-q to real-world protocols is discussed in Section 5.
2 Real-World Protocols
Often the network environment plays a central role in what demands
can be made on real-world protocols. For example, running over TCP,
TLS can make strong demands on packet delivery while DTLS over
UDP cannot. Such demand variation can be desirable: it could be
appropriate for a financial transaction to fail if a message packet is
dropped in a TLS connection while it would be annoying for a video
call to fail every time a frame is missing in a DTLS connection. Here
we consider a sampling of protocols with increasingly weaker channel
demands.
TLS (Fully reliable channel.) TLS stands on the precipice of
change: the current standard (TLS 1.2 [DR08]) uses key confirmation
messages which prevent key indistinguishability while the new
standard draft (TLS 1.3 [Res16]) enables key indistinguishability.
However, even after standardization of TLS 1.3, past versions are
likely to persist in use for a long time to come, due to the lifespan of
devices using those versions and backwards compatibility. As noted
above, the ACCE model plays a central role in various analyses of
TLS 1.2 [JKSS12, KPW13].
802.11 (Packet drops allowed.) As the basis of wireless communi-
cation, 802.11 is designed to accommodate a variety of demands and
consequently does not require perfect packet delivery [IEE12]. How-
ever, it does cover replay protection and re-ordering. While 802.11
does not suffer from the lack of key indistinguishability that usually
propels protocols into an ACCE model analysis, it is possible to use
the ACCE to analyze it.
QUIC (Packet drops and re-ordering allowed.) Google’s Quick
Internet UDP Connections (QUIC) protocol was proposed in answer
to the delay incurred by the round-trips (RTT) of using a full TLS
handshake. Analyses of QUIC have used differing approaches. [FG14]
employed an idealized version of the key derivation, thus avoiding the
issue of key indistinguishability. Another work [LJBN15] employed
an ACCE definition to address channel security establishment. Due
to the multiple session keys in QUIC, the authors adapted the ACCE
definition, defining QACCE (Quick ACCE). However, the formulation
of encryption and decryption queries obscures the connection to the
original ACCE experiment. Our definitions fit within the adapted
framework of Lychev et al. while maintaining a clear link to ACCE
as we adapt the channel oracle queries while leaving room for variation
in adversarial capabilities and partnering definition variations.
DTLS (Packet drops, re-ordering, and possible replays allowed.)
Despite the extensive attention on TLS, very little attention has been
given to DTLS (currently at version DTLS 1.2) [RM12]. DTLS is a
TLS variant, designed for use in environments that cannot achieve
the strict requirements of TLS. Namely, DTLS running UDP must
be able to adapt to packet dropping and re-ordering. As a result,
while DTLS mirrors TLS, results on the security of the latter cannot
simply be extended to it. Note that there are two variants of DTLS:
with replay protection and without. Essentially, this results in two
distinct protocols with different channel guarantees.
3 ACCE
ACCE runs in two phases: a pre-accept phase and a post-accept phase,
differentiated by the status of key acceptance. Before key acceptance,
the pre-accept phase handles session matching, where an adversary
wins if it gets a session oracle to accept maliciously. After key
acceptance, channel security under the session key is handled in the
post-accept phase, where correctly answering an AEAD encryption
challenge implies an adversarial win. Thus, a break in ACCE security
can occur in either or both phases. In this section we present the
ACCE post-accept phase Encrypt, and Decrypt oracles from [JKSS12]
and later revisions [JKSS11], and include small revisions from other
sources [KPW13, BSWW13]. For more details relating to the ACCE
model; general definitions for oracles Send,Reveal, and Corrupt; and
experiments, see [JKSS12, JKSS11]. We use the standard stateful
AEAD primitive, omitted here due to space restrictions.
Let {P1, . . . , Pl} be a set of identities, for l ∈ N, where each Pi
possesses a long-term key-pair (ski, pki) and is modeled by a collection
of session oracles pi1i , . . . , pidi . Each pisi has access to (ski, pki), as well
as pk1, . . . , pkl. Let bsi , a bit selected at random as bsi
$← {0, 1} at the
start of the game.
Encrypt(pisi , l, ad,m0,m1):
1: u← u+ 1
2: (c(0), st(0)E )
$← st.Enc(K, l, ad,m0, stE)
3: (c(1), st(1)E )
$← st.Enc(K, l, ad,m1, stE)
4: if c(0) = ⊥ or c(1) = ⊥ then
5: return ⊥
6: (adu, cu, stE)← (ad, c(bPs ), st(b
P
s )
E )
7: return cu
Decrypt(pisi , ad, c):
1: if bPs = 0 then
2: return ⊥
3: v ← v + 1
4: (m, stD)
← st.Dec(K, ad, c, stD)
5: if (u < v) ∨ (c 6= cv) ∨ (ad 6=
adv) then
6: phase← 1
7: if phase = 1 then
8: return m
9: return ⊥
Figure 2: ACCE security game oracles, for principal P and session
piPs , with session key K.
In the ACCE experiment for a protocol Π, ExpACCEΠ , a challenger
C takes as input a security parameter λ and plays a game with an
adversary A: C generates l pairs (ski, pki), for i ∈ [l] and implements
pisi for i ∈ [l] and s ∈ [d] and gives pk1, . . . , pkl to A as input. A
may make Send,Reveal, Corrupt, Encrypt, and Decrypt queries, until
it outputs a triple (i, s, b′) and terminates. A wins if b′ = bsi (i.e.
ExpACCEΠ = 1). Thus the advantage of A in ExpACCEΠ is defined as:
AdvACCEΠ (A) = |2 · Pr[ExpACCEΠ,A (λ) = 1]− 1| .
Following [KPW13], we include a check on the received associated
data in step 5 of Decrypt in Fig. 2. While this check was omitted in
[JKSS12, JKSS11], it is necessary for allowing an adversarial win in
the case of a collision. If an adversary submits a valid ad to the
decryption oracle along with c, from which c was not created via a
call to Encrypt, then the adversary has made a successful forgery.
Remark. The condensed nature of the oracles presented in Figure 2,
it could appear that successful trivial attacks could be mounted by A.
We comment on one such “false” attack here and how it is inhibited:
Suppose that an adversary simply modifies ad, without attempting to
break the AEAD, and subsequently submits valid ciphertexts to the
Decrypt oracle. In this scenario, A may hope that phase ← 1 since
ad 6= adv, and that subsequent decryption queries on valid ciphertexts
will therefore result in m being returned. However, this scenario is
covered by the security experiment:
If A modifies ad, then the decryption st.Dec should fail, with the result
that m = ⊥ at step 5. This would result in ad 6= sent.adv, leading to
phase← 1 and m being returned. As m = ⊥, the adversary gains no
advantage. Subsequent, even correct decryption oracle queries depend
on the st.Dec algorithm in question: these should result in m = ⊥
as well, based on the AEAD goals, but could alternatively result in a
valid adversarial win under correct decryption as phase = 1.
Due to space constraints, the following definition omits key
acceptance, identity corruption, and key reveal conditions, as well
as ACCE details linked to pre-acceptance. This matches our focus
on channel oracles.
Definition 3.1 (ACCE – Secure Channel). A protocol Π is a (t, )-
secure channel ACCE protocol if, for all adversaries A which run in
time t, when A terminates and outputs (i, s, b′) such that
AdvACCEΠ (A) = |Pr[b′ = bsi ]− 1/2| <  .
4 Extended ACCE
We now extend the ACCE Encrypt and Decrypt oracles for other
secure channel variants with weaker channel demands. Following the
hierarchy of AEAD demands of [BHMS16], we have the following
ACCE-q hierarchy based on the post-accept channel experiment:
• q = 1: AEAD
• q = 2: AEAD with replay detection
• q = 3: AEAD with replay detection and ensured strictly increasing
packet ordering
• q = 4: AEAD with replay detection, strictly increasing packet
ordering, and no drops (original ACCE)
Each q-th level of ACCE-q corresponds to a test condition
(conditionq) in the oracle queries of Fig. 3.
Building on the ACCE oracles, we require each pisi to also maintain
a set of sent ciphertexts sent.Csi and received ciphertexts rcvd.Csi ,
where the u-th entry in sent.Csi is written sent.cu and the v-th entry
in rcvd.Csi is written rcvd.cv. This move mirrors the original ACCE
definition [JKSS12] where a list of ciphertexts Csi was maintained by
pisi , and the u-th entry was referred to as Csi [u] (in comparison to cu,
see line 7 in Fig. 2). As maintaining such a list was unnecessary to the
channel authentication goals of ACCE, later works used the simplified
model presented in Fig. 2 (e.g. [KPW13]). We reintroduce the sent
ciphertext list in a simplified form and add a received ciphertext
list due to the complexity of modeling weaker channel demands,
especially at condition3 (see Fig. 3). Likewise, our list element
notation is aimed for enhancing comprehensibility of conditionq.
Remark. Encrypt and Decrypt oracles for ACCE-4 correspond
exactly to the original ACCE experiment oracles. The notational
changes in ACCE-4 from the original ACCE (i.e. sent.cu vs cu, rcvd
notation, etc.), and the addition of line 4 in Decrypt (for variable
assignment) are not necessary. They are included in ACCE-4 for
comparison and uniformity to the oracles of ACCE-1,2,3. In the case
of ACCE-4, lines 6 and 7 of Decrypt in Fig. 3 match line 5 of Decrypt
in Fig. 2, under notational changes.
Remark. The addition of m 6= ⊥ at line 8 is necessitated by standard
protocol behavior at lower levels: 802.11, DTLS, and IPsec [Ken05]
all require the silent dropping of a message under authentication
failure. Generally, such protocols are required to be robust to
authentication failures, as they are based on an unreliable transport
(such as UDP for DTLS). In comparison, Level 4 protocols, such as
TLS, do not need to allow this luxury.
There are optional alternatives: while DTLS [RM12, pg. 12]
mandates that implementations should silently discard messages
Encrypt(pisi , l, ad,m0,m1):
1: u← u+ 1
2: (c(0), st(0)E )
$← st.Enc(K, l, ad,m0, stE)
3: (c(1), st(1)E )
$← st.Enc(K, l, ad,m1, stE)
4: if c(0) = ⊥ or c(1) = ⊥ then
5: return ⊥
6: (sent.adu, sent.cu, stE)
← (ad, c(bPs ), st(bPs )E )
7: return sent.cu
Decrypt(pisi , ad, c):
1: if bPs = 0 then
2: return ⊥
3: v ← v + 1
4: (rcvd.adv, rcvd.cv)← (ad, c)
5: (m, stD)
← st.Dec(K, ad, c, stD)
6: if (q = 4) ∧ condition4 then
7: phase← 1
8: else if (m 6= ⊥) ∧ conditionq
then
9: phase← 1
10: if phase = 1 then
11: return m
12: return ⊥
1. AEAD:
condition1 = (@w : (c = sent.cw) ∧ (ad = sent.adw))
2. AEAD, no replays:
condition2 = (@w : (c = sent.cw) ∧ (ad = sent.adw)) ∨ (∃w < v : c =
rcvd.cw)
3. AEAD, no replays, strict incr. order:
condition3 = (@w : (c = sent.cw) ∧ (ad = sent.adw)) ∨ (∃w, x, y :
(w < v) ∧ (sent.cx = rcvd.cw) ∧ (sent.cy = rcvd.cv) ∧ (x ≥ y))
4. AEAD, no replays, strict incr. order, no drops:
condition4 = (u < v) ∨ (c 6= sent.cv) ∨ (ad 6= sent.adv)
Figure 3: Encrypt and Decrypt oracles for the ACCE-q security game
corresponding to secure channel condition q, with stateful AEAD
scheme stAEAD = (Gen, Init, st.Enc, st.Dec).
under authentication failure, they are allowed to output a fatal alert,
closing the connection (similarly to TLS). Adjusting the Decrypt
oracle to accommodate analysis of such special implementations is
simple: m 6= ⊥ on line 7 is removed, making the test conditions at
all levels the same, namely conditionq. However, as such variation is
not recommended by protocols in general, and we leave such special
cases as non-standard.
In Fig. 3, condition1 demands that the received ciphertext/ad
pair has been sent at some time. Correspondingly, condition2 makes
the same requirements as condition1 but also allows A to win if the
ciphertext has previously been received. Formulating the constraint
of condition3 requires finesse: the desired condition must test replay
protection and strict increasing order, but still allow packet dropping.
The first half of the disjunction handles authentication; the second
half checks for the existence of any two packets for which the sending
and receiving order has been switched, and replays are accounted for
if x = y, i.e. the same packet was received twice (w < v). Finally
condition4 checks that the received packet is exactly as sent.
Experiments for the various AEAD levels are linked in [BHMS16].
We inherit these theorems for ACCE-q: Theorem 4.1 demonstrates
how security at one ACCE level implies that of lower levels.
Theorem 4.1 (ACCE-(q+1) implies ACCE-q). Let
Π be a stateful AEAD scheme with encryption and decryption
algorithms st.Enc and st.Dec, and let q ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For any adversary A,
AdvACCE-qΠ (A) ≤ |AdvACCE-(q+1)Π (A)| .
The proof follows according that of [BHMS16].
5 Application
The hierarchy of ACCE-q channel oracles is applicable to the analysis
of many protocols, including DTLS. Note that such an analysis is non-
trivial: despite DTLS being designed on TLS, the initial handshake
as well as the channel protocol must account for both packet dropping
and re-ordering as well as (potentially) replays. These considerations
lead to slight but extremely important changes to the protocol,
requiring special attention during analysis and prohibiting a simple
extension of TLS results to DTLS.
Table 1 poses possible alignments of ACCE-q models to the
real-world protocols discussed in Section 2, as well as the current
analysis status of those protocols. This is not an exhaustive list, but
demonstrates how the model hierarchy can be used to associate and
compare analyses, and analysis goals, of protocols.
We align the QUIC protocol to ACCE-1, and note the ACCE
variant used by Lychev et al. [LJBN15]. While the goals of QACCE
align to those of ACCE-1, they differ by customization to a multi-
stage protocol and clarity of alignment to the original ACCE model.
QACCE is customized for handling the two key stages of QUIC
(i.e. the early data key stage and data exchange key stage). Such
customization could also be done with ACCE-1, or indeed any ACCE-
q, by separating the encryptions and decryptions in Encrypt and
Decrypt into stages; if the protocol was in stage 1, for example, st.Enc
Level Protocol Analysis Status
ACCE-1 DTLS 1.2 Unanalyzed
QUIC Analyzed (variant) [LJBN15]
ACCE-2 DTLS 1.2+ Unanalyzed
ACCE-3 802.11 ACCE model optional
ACCE-4 TLS 1.2 Analyzed [JKSS12, KPW13]
Table 1: ACCE-q in analyses. DTLS 1.2+ refers to DTLS inclusive
of optional replay protection.
and st.Dec would have a first input of K1, while in stage 2 they would
each take as input K2.
Comparison to other ACCE models is also a salient issue. Due to
slight changes in the channel encryption and decryption oracles for
QACCE, the clarity of comparison to ACCE is obscured. Namely, the
authors use deterministic nonce-based AEAD instead of probabilistic
stateful AEAD (as used in ACCE), and strictly require that plaintexts
m0 and m1 are of equal length, in comparison to ACCE which more
broadly allows optional length-hiding for the ciphertext. While the
change to deterministic nonce-based encryption for AEAD could
allow for slightly stronger security analysis using IND$-CPA as
discussed in [Rog02], the authors instead use IND-CPA2. Thus the
potential advantage of this modeling choice is precluded.
In comparison, use of our ACCE-q variants would elucidate the
connections between analyses instead of obscuring them, while still
allowing flexibility for all parts of the ACCE model external to the
Encrypt and Decrypt oracles. This provides flexibility, for example
allowing for QACCE variations of Reveal queries, new Connect and
Resume queries, etc., or partnering definitions.
Ultimately, Theorem 4.1 links analyses of protocols at various
levels and allows for a clear comparison of the secure channels
established by such protocols. For example, if DTLS was proven
to be secure using ACCE-1, or 802.11 was proven to be secure using
ACCE-3, then Theorem 4.1 would directly relate the security of those
protocols.
2Length-hiding IND-CPA combined with INT-CTXT yields length-hiding AE,
while stateful length-hiding IND-CPA combined with INT-sfCTXT is equivalent
to stateful length-hiding AE [PRS11]. The latter combination is the basis for
ACCE (Fig. 2).
6 Conclusion
In the context of modern cryptography, secure channels play an
integral role – secure messaging, standard internet protocols, and
the extended world of IoT all rely upon the existence of these
constructs. These ACCE variants not only enable modeling of
protocols under various demands, but builds clear links among
the modeling differences of such demands and therefore among the
protocols themselves. We view these ACCE variants as fundamental
to security analyses of DTLS (both with and without replay
protection), which is as yet an open issue, and for clarifying the link
between such analyses and those of TLS.
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